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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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Nationalist China: Ambassador Drumright believes that Prime Minister Chen Cheng intends to resign if Mongolia is granted membership in the UN, although he would retain his position as vice president and constitutional successor to President Chiang Kai-shek. Chen's resignation would probably be the forerunner of increasing internal stresses in the regime. Chen has indicated he believes his resignation would be mandatory in view of the unanimous resolution by the Legislative Yuan last June which enjoins the government to use every means prescribed in the UN Charter to bar Mongolia from the UN.

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France: Antoine Pinay, the conservative ex-premier, will reportedly soon announce through the press his candidacy for leadership of a coalition government designed eventually to replace the Debré cabinet and presumably--should De Gaulle resist the idea--to be ready to assume power following the "legal" ouster of De Gaulle.

Pinay may be encouraged by the increasing willingness of responsible military officers to concern themselves with the problems of De Gaulle's succession. They are disturbed over De Gaulle's Algerian policy and to some extent over his attitude toward NATO, but their primary concern is that a successor regime be republican rather than fascist, and that the transition be orderly. In late September

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that the army would not take power but would make its support felt "by moving a few strategically located regiments"--particularly paratroops and forces in Germany.

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
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Nepal: Subarna Shumsheré, leader of Népali exiles in India and former deputy prime minister of Nepal, has reportedly given up hope of reaching a compromise with King Mahendra to restore some measure of representative government to Nepal. He now plans to launch a campaign of agitation against the regime when the King returns from state visits to Communist China and Mongolia. Subarna has been under increasing pressure from other exiled leaders to take more forceful action against the King. His decision in favor of direct action now--despite the odds against its success--apparently stems from the unlikelihood of his obtaining Indian support and his inability to persuade Mahendra to meet with him when the monarch passed through India in late August and again in late September. [redacted]

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
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#### WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:]

No

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future. However, current military measures associated with Soviet bloc - Warsaw Pact exercises are improving bloc military capabilities in Eastern Europe, and could afford the bloc a cover for preparations for hostilities.]

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**SELECTED INTELLIGENCE  
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

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Bloc support of the Communist effort against the Government of Vietnam: extent and nature. U.S.I.B. SNIE 53-2-61.


Oct 5'61. [redacted]

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Soviet tactics in the Berlin crisis. U.S.I.B. SNIE 11-10/1-61. Oct 5'61. [redacted]

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Soviet threat to Iran and the CENTO area: estimate of the USSR's intentions, members' vulnerability to Soviet threats, and likely reactions to US moves concerning CENTO. U.S.I.B. SNIE 11-12-61. Oct 5'61. [redacted]




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**DAILY BRIEF**

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Nepali Exiles May Attempt Move Against King Mahendra

[Previous reports indicated that Subarna's organization had been aiming at mid-October--when the King would be out of the country--as its possible target date for the beginning of agitation designed to restore the Nepali Congress party to power. Subarna, however, appeared to be holding a final decision in abeyance in the hope that he could reach some sort of accommodation with the King in a face-to-face encounter on Indian soil. Subarna's reported decision now to await the monarch's return from Communist China and Mongolia before setting off the agitation within Nepal suggests that he may retain some slight hope that the threat of such action will persuade the King to compromise.]

[Subarna's effort since December to rally the Nepali exiles in India and to create a viable network with Nepal has been complicated by his own indecision and by periodic shortages of funds. In addition, he has failed to gain any significant international support for his movement. The Praja Socialist party in India has afforded him some assistance, and he has reportedly obtained a few small arms from the Burmese and the Israeli Socialists. The Indian Government and India's ruling Congress party, however, have been circumspect in their dealings with Subarna, allowing him freedom of movement and activity, privately sympathizing with his cause, warning him against embarrassing New Delhi in its relations with Katmandu, refusing direct support, and, on occasion, urging him to seek an accord with the King.]

[Subarna probably recognizes that he has little prospect of overthrowing the King if the Indian Government remains aloof. He also appears to realize that his organization's momentum--and perhaps his control--is likely to begin to slip unless some action against the monarch is undertaken soon. He appears to have despaired of obtaining advance pledges of support and now may calculate that he can draw support from India once he has something going.]

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Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

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The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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